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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants do not dispute the affidavit of Karla Winkler, 
which states that the Industrial Commission did not receive written 
notice. The defendants cannot disregard clear statutory language 
and create a procedure contrary to the Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
43(3) (b). To allow them to do that would allow defendants to 
create legislation. That is the role of the legislature and not 
the Industrial Commission or the judiciary. When the legislature 
changed the statute in 1995 to read the way the defendants want the 
old statute to be interpreted is clear evidence that the 
legislature did its job. However, the new statute cannot be 
applied retroactively because the new statute does not clarify how 
the earlier statute should have been understood and retroactive 
application would grant defendants' greater rights and it would 
impose greater liability upon the applicants. Lastly, defendants 
claim that public policy dictates that Mr. Olsen's family be 
deprived of his death benefits because they will be at odds with 
the employer about coverage. Defendants cite no cases in support 
of this claim, and, contrary to defendants' claim, declaratory 
actions are frequently filed when either the insured or the 
insurance company have a dispute that relates to statutory 
interpretation. Also, because defendants freely admit that they 
disregarded the requirement that written notice be sent to the 
Industrial Commission their public policy claim is ineffectual. 
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REPLY POINT I 
UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-43(3) (b) REQUIRES WRITTEN 
NOTICE AND IT WAS NOT GIVEN. THE DEFENDANTS DO 
NOT HAVE THE POWER TO REWRITE THE STATUTE AT 
THEIR CONVENIENCE AND DISREGARD THE CLEAR AND 
UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE. 
A. KARLA WINKLER'S AFFIDAVIT THAT THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION DID NOT RECEIVE WRITTEN NOTICE IS UNCHALLENGED 
In the defendants' Point I, they cite RDG Assoc. /Jorman Corp. 
v. Indus, Com'n. 741 P.2d 948, 951 (Utah 1987), which states that, 
"proper construction of a statute must further its purposes." 
However, the defendants fail to say what the purpose of the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act is. The Utah Supreme Court has 
unequivocally stated: 
The Workmen's Compensation Act is to be construed 
liberally to further the statutory purposes of providing 
relief from injuries caused by industrial accidents. . . 
. The Industrial Commission is in the first instance 
responsible for effectuating the purposes of the Act by 
construing its provisions to secure its humane 
objectives. (Cite omitted). 
Pinter Constr. Co. v. Frisby. 678 P.2d 305, 306 (Utah 1984) . The 
statute in question, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43(3)(b), states that 
the corporation "shall serve written notice upon its insurance 
carrier and upon the commission . . . " otherwise the officer or 
director is still considered an employee. (Emphasis added). In 
this case, the employer did not serve written notice upon the 
Commission. It is uncontested that Karla Winkler's affidavit, 
which states, " [a]ccording to our files & [sic] to the best of my 
knowledge the Industrial Commission has not received a corporation 
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exclusion form on Samuel Mcintyre [sic] Investments" (R. 30), 
establishes that an employer must file a corporation exclusion form 
with the Commission and it was not filed. The Fund's sending a 
computer tape does not satisfy the clear and unambiguous language 
of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-43(3) (b) . What is noticeably lacking in 
the defendants brief is any reply or even a comment to Ms. 
Winkler's affidavit. Because Mr. Olsen's request to the Fund did 
not satisfy the statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
43(3)(b), he was, therefore, still considered an employee of the 
corporation. 
Defendants also claim that notice is for the benefit of the 
party who is to receive the notice. This is simply not true under 
the Worker's Compensation Act. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-97(2) requires 
an employee to give the employer or the Commission notice of an 
injury within 180 days of the injury or the employee is barred from 
any claim of benefits. However, §35-1-97(4) (a) also requires the 
employer to give notice of an accident to the Industrial Commission 
within seven days of any of the following: a) the occurrence of the 
injury; b) the employer's first knowledge of the injury; or c) 
after the employee's notification of injury to the employer. The 
notice the employer must give to the Industrial Commission neither 
tolls the statute of limitations for the employee's benefit nor can 
it be used as a defense by the employer, if the employer fails to 
give the notice. (See, Kennecott Corp. V. Industrial Comm'n. 740 
P.2d 305 (Utah App. 1987). For whatever reason, the legislature 
requires the employer to give the Commission notice of every injury 
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and death arising out of and in the course of employment. This 
notice does not benefit either the Industrial Commission or the 
employee. Likewise, the legislature required, in Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-43 (3) (b) , that the employer give written notice to the 
Commission when an officer or director was no longer covered by 
compensation insurance. Until this written notice is given the 
officer or director is considered an employee. 
The defendants also claim that because the notification 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §§35-1-47 and 31A-22-1002 were met, 
that somehow the written notice of §35-1-43 (3) (b) was also met. 
Defendants fail to point out, however, that the notice requirements 
of §§35-1-47 and 31A-22-1002 do not require written notice, which 
is required in §35-1-43 (3) (b) . Essentially, the defendants are 
trying to bootstrap the required written notice of §35-1-43(3) (b) 
onto two different statutes that require different types of notice. 
The legislature used different language for the different statutes 
and despite compliance with §§35-1-47 and 31A-22-1002, this Court, 
"must assume 'that each term in the statute was used advisedly; 
thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading 
is unreasonably confused or inoperable.'" . . . (Cites omitted and 
emphasis added) . Murphy v. Crosland, 886 P. 2d 74, 79-80 (Utah App. 
1994). As pointed out in applicants' first brief and it was not 
disputed in defendants' brief, the reading of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
43(3) (b) is not unreasonably confused or inoperable. Therefore, 
written notice had to be given by the employer to the Industrial 
Commission and computer tapes sent by the Fund to the Commission do 
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not satisfy that requirement. Therefore, defendants' argument that 
notice was given must fail. 
Defendants' next claim that Ms. Olsen and her three children 
are using the statute as a sword instead of a shield and that to 
grant benefits would be akin to allowing the fox to police the 
henhouse. Both of these arguments are very misleading and 
offensive. There is absolutely no evidence of fraud or 
misrepresentation by the employer. Defendants' statement implies 
that Mr. Olsen gave the Fund notice and then went out and 
intentionally got run over by a train so that his family could have 
benefits. Defendants' argument also implies that officers and 
directors have given notice with the intent to get injured. 
Defendants' argument borders on the absurd. 
On the other hand, the Fund was perfectly capable of "policing 
the henhouse" and simply failed to do so. The Fund admits that it 
never observed the requirement of giving written notice to the 
Industrial Commission (Defendants' Brief p. 12) and it may have 
done this as many as 26,500 times. (R. 63) This is remarkable 
admission of neglect, because the Fund has an entire department of 
legal counsel, the Fund only provides worker's compensation 
insurance, and the Fund is the largest workers' compensation 
carrier in the state. The Fund had 26,500 opportunities to see to 
it that the statutory requirements were met and the Fund freely 
admits that it never observed the statutory requirement of written 
notice to the Commission. All the Fund had to do is ask the 
employer to send a copy of the Industrial Commission's written 
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notice to the Fund or it would continue to charge the employer a 
premium. Or, the Fund could have simply called the Industrial 
Commission and asked if a corporation exclusion form had been 
received. If the Commission had not received one, then the Fund 
could inform the employer that premiums will continue. Instead, 
the Fund chose to disregard the clear language of the statute and 
to stop collecting premiums without any assurance that the statute 
was complied with. The Fund does not seem to understand that 
noncompliance with Utah Code Ann. 35-1-43(3) (b) has a direct impact 
on them as well as on the officer or director. The Fund was in the 
best position to "police the henhouse" and the Fund not only failed 
to do so, but wilfully chose not to on every occasion. 
B. Strict Statutory Requirements Are Not "Absurd" 
Unless One Party Wilfully Disregards Them and Defendants 
Did Not Reasonable Rely On The Employees Notice 
As shown in applicants' first brief and above, the plain and 
clear language of §35-1-43(3) (b) requires written notice be given 
to both the insurance carrier and the Industrial Commission, 
otherwise the corporate officer is still considered an employee. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the employer gave notice to the Fund 
and not the Industrial Commission does not create an "absurd" 
result. In Lamarr v. Utah State DOT, 828 P.2d 535 (UtahApp. 1992) 
this Court ruled that a plaintiff must give notice to UDOT and the 
Attorney General's office, even though the Attorney General is 
counsel for UDOT. Id. at 541. In fact, the court in Lamarr cited, 
in footnote 6, a Utah Federal District court decision, which 
states: 
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The court agrees with the defendants that the plain 
meaning of section 63-30-12 requires that two notices of 
claim should have been filed by plaintiff: one to the 
Attorney General and one to the University of Utah. 
Although this statutory requirement may result in 
redundant notice being given, such redundancy apparently 
is mandated by the statute inasmuch as the Utah Attorney 
General is the agent and legal counsel for all state 
agencies, including the University of Utah. In this 
pendant state law claim, the court is unwilling to ignore 
the unambiguous language of the Utah statute requiring 
two separate notices, especially where the Utah Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that strict compliance with the 
notice of claim provision is essential to maintain a suit 
pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act. (Emphasis 
added) 
Kavwasa v. University of Utah, 785 F. Supp. 1445, 1446-7 (D.Utah 
1990). Although the above case involves a different statute, the 
legal principle is the same. The legislature requires that notice 
be given to two entities even though it appears to be redundant. 
In the case at hand, the legislature mandated notice be given 
to both the Fund and the Industrial Commission otherwise the 
decedent would still be considered an employee. Failure to give 
notice to two entities, even if it appears to be redundant, is not 
"absurd." What is absurd is the Fund admitting that it has never 
followed the statutory directive and it now asks this Court to 
create a remedy for the Fund because the Fund disregarded the 
statutory requirements. 
The defendants also claim that Mr. Olsen's family should be 
denied his death benefits because of equitable estoppel. The Utah 
Supreme Court stated, in Warren v. Provo City Corp. 838 P. 2d 1125, 
1130 (Utah 1992) (footnote 16), that a party, "claiming an estoppel 
cannot rely on representations or acts . . . if he had the means by 
which with reasonable diligence he could ascertain the true 
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situation." (citations omitted). The Fund cannot claim estoppel 
because the Fund knew the true situation. Moreover, the Fund 
admittedly chose to disregard the language of the statute and by 
doing so, helped create the situation that it now asks this court 
to deliver it from. It is startling that the Fund can claim 
estoppel when it knew full well that Mr. Olsen was considered an 
employee until the Commission received written notice. Therefore, 
the Industrial Commission's order granting review should be 
reversed and the ALJ's order reinstated, which grants the 
decedent's family death benefits. 
REPLY POINT I I 
THE STATUTORY CHANGES CANNOT BE RETROACTIVELY 
APPLIED BECAUSE IT WOULD GIVE DEFENDANTS 
GREATER RIGHTS AND IMPOSE GREATER LIABILITY ON 
THE APPLICANTS 
Defendants claim tha t the new s t a t u t e should be r e t r o a c t i v e l y 
applied in t h i s case. Again, Utah law i s very c lea r on t h i s i s sue . 
In Kennecott Corp. v. Indus. Com'n of Utah, 740 P. 2d 305 (Utah App. 
1987), t h i s Court s ta ted , " [ l ] a t e r s t a t u t e s or amendments may not 
be applied r e t r o a c t i v e l y to deprive a par ty r i g h t s or impose 
g rea te r l i a b i l i t y unless the l a t e r s t a t u t e or amendment c l a r i f i e s 
or amplifies how the e a r l i e r law should have been understood." Id. 
a t 308. If t h i s Court were to apply the s t a t u t e r e t r o a c t i v e l y then 
i t would deprive Mr. Olsen's family of r i gh t s and the s t a t u t e does 
not c l a r i fy or amplify how the e a r l i e r law should have been 
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understood. None of the cases cited by defendants discuss the 
workers' compensation statutes, like the Kennecott case does. 
Consequently, the cases cited by defendants are inapposite. 
Moreover, the cases cited by defendants all agree that a statute 
cannot be applied retroactively if it deprives a party rights or 
imposes greater liability. As shown above, that is exactly what 
the defendants want this court to do: to apply that statute 
retroactively so that the defendants have greater rights and the 
applicants are deprived of theirs. Therefore, defendants' second 
argument must fail and the Industrial Commission's order must be 
overturned. 
Moreover, the fact that the legislature changed the statute is 
a solid indication that it is the legislature's role to make that 
change and not the judiciary's or the defendants. In fact, the 
defendants implicitly concede that written notice was necessary and 
not given when they state, M[t]his amendment was clearly intended 
to eliminate the requirement to give notice to the Commission, 
either directly or indirectly.1' (Defendant's brief, p. 11). The 
statute in question requires written notice from the employer. 
Only if the statute has not been satisfied, such as in the present 
case, can "indirect11 notice by computer tape be claimed. The 
Industrial Commission followed the defendants' erroneous argument 
when it concluded that indirect notice via a computer tape 
satisfies the statutory requirement of written notice. The 
Commission erred because, "courts are not to infer substantive 
terms into the text that are not already there. Rather, the 
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interpretation must be based on the language used, and the court 
has no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not 
expressed." Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 
1994) . Although that language is addressed to district courts, the 
Industrial Commission does not have power to legislate either. 
The defendants also argue that the Fund and the Commission 
have established an accepted procedure of notice through the 
computer tape. Again, this claim ignores Ms. Winkler's affidavit. 
Besides, the defendants are admitting that the Fund and the 
Commission have rejected the legislature's requirement and have 
established their own procedure. In Bevans v. Industrial Comm'n, 
790 P.2d 573 (Utah App. 1990), this Court stated, M[t]he Industrial 
Commission is not free to 'legislate' in areas apparently 
overlooked by our lawmakers or to exercise power not expressly or 
impliedly granted to it by the legislature, even in the name of 
fairness." Id. at 578 (emphasis added). The Industrial Commission 
and the Fund cannot totally disregard the statutory requirement of 
written notice. If this Court affirms the Industrial Commission's 
order, then such a decision would give the Industrial Commission 
and the Fund the power to alter any statutory language at their 
convenience. Therefore, defendants' argument is without merit and 
the Commission's decision must be reversed. 
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REPLY POINT III 
DEFENDANTS7 PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENT IS MERITLESS 
BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS WILFULLY DISREGARDED THE 
STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF WRITTEN NOTICE 
Lastly, the defendants claim that public policy dictates that 
Mr. Olsen's family be denied death benefits. This would be 
inconsistent with Utah law, which states: 
While such an approach may occasionally result in 
decisions that seem harsh or unfair, it is for the 
legislature, not the judiciary, to remedy such results by 
amending or repealing the statute. Indeed, "if the act 
is unjust, amendments to correct the inequities should be 
made by the legislature and not by judicial 
interpretation." Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. 
& Mining Co. , 113 Utah 101, 126, 191 P.2d 612, 625, 
appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 93 L. Ed. 411, 69 S. Ct. 
138 (1948); see also Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 
P.2d 348, 377 (Utah 1989) (Hall, C.J., dissenting). ("It 
is not our prerogative to question the wisdom, social 
desirability, or public policy underlying a given 
statute. Those are matters left exclusively to the 
legislature's judgment and determination."); Utah Mfrs.' 
Ass'n v. Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 204, 23 P.2d 229, 232 
(1933)(Fairly debatable questions as to reasonableness, 
wisdom, or propriety [of legislative action] are not for 
the courts but for the Legislature.") ; . . . . (Citations 
omitted and emphasis added). 
White v. Deseelhorst. 879 P.2d 1371, 1378 (Utah 1994) (Justice 
Russon's dissenting opinion, footnote 2). The defendants state 
that, "if Olsen were found to be an employee . . . the Fund would 
be placed in the position of having to dispute coverage under the 
plan rather than guarding the interest of the Employer." 
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(Defendants' brief, p. 12)1. This claim is completely meritless. 
What defendants' are essentially arguing is that statutory language 
that directly impacts a contract must be disregarded, otherwise the 
parties will have a dispute about the contract. Insurance 
companies routinely deny coverage and base the denial on statutory 
language. Then either the insurance company or the insured file a 
declaratory action to determine if there is coverage or not. 
Ofttimes if an insurance company wins the declaratory action, then 
insured is exposed to liability or excess liability. See, Wagner 
v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 786 P. 2d 763 (Utah App. 1990) . In following 
the Fund's logic, then anytime an insured and the insurance company 
have a dispute over coverage that is affected by statute, then as 
a matter of public policy the statute must be ignored so there is 
no interference with the contract. Defendants do not cite a single 
case in support of this unfounded position and it is meritless. 
See, Neel v. State, 889 P. 2d 922 (Utah 1995); State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987). In the present 
case, the defendants ignored the statute, knowing that Mr. Olsen 
would still be considered an employee, and now want this Court's 
help because they claim it may affect their contract with the 
employer. 
The defendants also try to create a sense of panic by claiming 
that if this Court decides that the Fund is liable in this case, 
The applicants question defendants' claim that if Mr. Olsen was found 
to be an employee, then the dispute between the Fund and the employer would create 
a situation that violates public policy. The fact that the Fund's legal counsel 
still represents both the employer and the Fund makes this claim questionable at 
best. 
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then the Fund is potential liability for thousands of claims. 
Also, the public would not be served if this occurs because there 
could be thousands of lawsuits. This is absurd. First, because 
the statute was amended in 1995 (more than VA years ago) any claim 
that may be raised must first get past the statute of limitations. 
Consequently, a'ny claim for death benefits under the old statute is 
wholly barred because such a claim must be filed within one year of 
the employee's death. Also, if the director or officer did not 
report the injury to the employer within 180 days of the injury 
then any claim for benefits is wholly barred. Any claim more than 
six years old is also wholly barred if the employee did not file a 
claim with the Industrial Commission within six years. The Fund 
did not present any evidence to the Industrial Commission that 
additional claims have been filed or even would be filed. The Fund 
is asking this Court to make a decision based upon pure 
speculation, which "violates the basic premise upon which our 
judicial system is founded." Willey v. Willey. 914 P. 2d 1149, 
1151 (Utah App. 1996). 
Furthermore, if anyone were successful in getting past the 
statute of limitations, then the Fund would only have to collect 
past premiums from those employers. Additionally, the more time 
that passes the smaller the risk. What is truly ironic is that the 
defendants candidly admit that they wilfully disregarded clear 
statutory requirements, perhaps as many as 26,500 times, which 
directly put defendants this situation, and now they ask this Court 
to bail them out because public policy dictates it. Applicants 
13 
fail to see how defendants misfeasance can protect the public and 
promote public interest. Therefore, the defendants' argument is 
meritless and the Industrial Commission's order must be overturned 
and the ALJ's order reinstated. 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission's order that states that the 
computer tape satisfies the written notice requirement of Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-43 (3) (b) is erroneous. To allow that order to stand 
would give power to the defendants to rewrite statutes at their 
convenience. Utah law simply does not allow the Industrial 
Commission and the Fund to legislate. The legislature has changed 
the statute, which is the legislative role, not the judiciary's. 
Utah law does not allow a statute to be applied retroactively if 
greater rights are given or if others are deprived of theirs, which 
would happen in the case at hand. The defendants' admission that 
they never observed the statutory requirement, not only in this 
case, but in as many as 26,500 cases, defeats their argument that 
the Commission's order should be upheld for public policy reasons. 
Defendants should be held accountable for their misfeasance. 
Therefore, the Industrial Commission's order must be overturned and 
the ALJ's order reinstated, which orders the Fund to pay the death 
benefits to Mr. Olsen's widow and their three children. 
DATED this 24th day of October, 1996. 
MILLER, J R . l ^ 
for Appellants/ 
UGEtfE C. 
Atrornevs 
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